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3Introduction
The idea of “Europeanizing” Russia has been out in the open for quite a long time. With
the dissolution of Soviet Union and establishing democratic rule in Russia in 1991, the majority
of Western States shared the euphoria about the future development of the Russian Federation.
Indeed, Russia adopted a new constitution, became a part of several major international
organizations (such as Council of Europe, OSCE, etc.), and struggled to achieve a market
economy.  As time went by, however, it became apparent that Russia is not as eager to adopt
European values as it was suggested at first. Even during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia
expressed dissatisfaction with USA and European policy towards the conflict in Yugoslavia, and
even changed its military doctrine, reserving for itself the right to use nuclear weapons in
regional conflicts in case of emergency. After Vladimir Putin came to power, the state of affairs
with human rights and democracy became even more alarming.
The EU tried to influence Russia through its mechanism of conditionality: a process of
providing a reward to the country in exchange for the compliance to the policy conditions set by
European Union. The most powerful tool of conditionality policy of European Union is
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) - a project developed for promoting security in Europe’s
periphery. Most of the ENP participants have a long-term goal of accession to the EU; however,
it is not an obligatory rule. Russia refused to join ENP, as it did not want to be seen simply as a
“neighbor”, one of the others. Instead, Russia and the EU created the Four Common Spaces
Agreement which in essence is very similar to ENP agreements (and which is guided and funded
by the same institution – the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)), but
with additional stress on the fact that the partners mutually benefit from this agreement and are
absolutely equal. However, even the existence of such an agreement did not lead to the desired
outcome – the reports on the Four Common Spaces Agreement show only very moderate success
in the implementation of it, and the Road Maps that have been agreed upon almost seven years
ago, in 2005, are still not executed. International observers agree that the Europeanization of
Russia is indeed not going very well. According to both the Economist Intelligence Unit’s
“Index of Democracy” and Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” report, Russia is
considered “not free”/”authoritarian regime”, and the level of corruption, according to
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, has grown since 1990’s .
Why, then, is the EU’s policy of conditionality (mostly) not working with Russia? Sub-
questions of this thesis are: 1) how can we explain the fact that Russia still adopt some of the EU
rules? and 2) why the European Union is not able to make Russia adopt all of the rules that are
mentioned in the bilateral agreements?
4Following the model created by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, I argue that four things
influence Russia’s reluctance to adopt the EU rules. First of all, the ultimate prize of the EU
accession is absent in Russia’s case, and the EU is unable to propose other reward which is
equally significant and achievable.
I also argue that one of the reasons for the lack of rule adoption on Russia’s side is the fact
that conditional agreements between Russia and the EU have a very weak language, and terms
and conditions are not specified, which complicates the process of achieving the goal of
“Europeanizing” Russia.
Another issue is that the threats and promises of the EU are not too credible – the EU
sometimes is too motivated to reward Russia for any kind of cooperation, which, in addition to
the absence of the agreement on the policy towards Russia within the EU, makes it even more
troublesome to be consistent in giving out “carrots and sticks”.
My last argument is that Russia, being an authoritarian state, has too many elite
representatives that would lose their position of power if Russia is to become more “European”,
therefore they block the effective cooperation between Russia and the EU and try to maintain the
good image of Russia without actually carrying out the reforms.
My central finding is that the main reason for Russia’s lack of rule adoption is indeed the
lack of the grand reward that would encourage Russia’s participation. Instead, the conditional
agreement has three lesser rewards that can be achieved without accepting the whole set of
conditions, which allows Russia to pick what they would like to do and what not. The role of
elites, “veto players” is also significant, although because of the sensitivity and the lack of a
stable track record of the issue it remained impossible to rule out exactly how much of an impact
veto players really make on Russia’s compliance to the agreements. Regarding the consistency
of threats and rewards, the EU has a mixed record: on the one hand, it does not explicitly
contradict itself and does not provide rewards when it explicitly said it will not, but the lack of
common strategy towards Russia within the EU (the fact that Russia strongly supports and tries
to maintain) makes its position far less stable. Unclear terms of the agreement, however, appear
to be a consequence rather than the cause of Russia’s reluctance to adopt the rules: seeing as the
EU has only few rewards that can interest Russia, and they are not of a grand nature like the EU
accession.  Russia prefers not to agree to the conditions that are not favorable for it. Because of
the lack of a common strategy towards Russia, the EU tends to prefer a weak agreement with
Russia over no agreement at all.
This thesis will be structured as follows: at first I am going to introduce literature review,
theoretical framework and research methods of this work. Then I am going to do an overview of
the main conditional agreements between Russia and the EU and explain why the Road Maps to
5the Four Common Spaces (and the annual progress reports for them) are the primary focus of the
examination. Then I am going to examine the data from the Annual Reports in relation to the
four hypotheses that I pose, which will lead to creation of the four parts of the thesis:
“Determinacy of the rules”, “The size and speed of the reward”, “Credibility of conditional
threats and promises” and “Veto players”. Then I will go on making a conclusion which would
include findings of the work, as well as policy advice for the EU to make their efforts more
efficient.
Literature review
Although quite a few researchers have touched upon a subject of the possibilities of the
Europeanization of Russia and limits of integration with it, in-depth studies on conditionality in
Russia have not been conducted yet.
Russia’s reluctance to accept conditionality and adopt proposed rules can be explained by
the difference of approaches of the two powers – the EU has a more liberal approach, while
Russia accepts a realist approach, which is based on the “zero-sum game” idea. Therefore
submitting to conditions is seen as a failure, weakness and could not be accepted (Medvedev,
2008). Related to that, the clash of the main concepts that the sides use in their relationship –
Europeanization and Sovereignty – is also seen as highly important reason of Russian non-
compliance (Emerson et al., 2001; Krastev 2007). Sovereignty aims at protecting internal order,
while Europeanization - at projecting it (Medvedev, 2008). Russia insists on protecting it
sovereignty, by which it means that it should decide on its internal politics without any
assistance from the outside, and the imposition of conditionality would mean undermining such
sovereignty (Gower, 2008). Russia does not want to take the EU rules unilaterally, and the EU
does not want to “converge” towards Russian standards either. Russia and the EU seem to have
different perceptions of what the Europe is, and what the European values are, which causes
further complications in the relationship (Baranovsky, 2000). Consequently, there is also the lack
of political will for unifying reforms on the side of Russia. There has also been an argument that
the EU should not pursue conditionality after all, as even transferring more money and
technology to Russia might not result in any kind of partnership (Barysch, 2010).
Russia and the EU also have mutually exclusive interests in regards to the “wider Europe”.
The ENP was initially designed for all the European territories, including Russia. But Russia has
never been positive about the EU’ activities in the “Near Abroad”, as this area is considered to
be Russia’s “sphere of interests”. Russia challenged the EU hegemonic position and offered the
normative alternative to European concepts by developing the notion of “sovereign democracy”
(Haekkala, 2008; Averre, 2007).
6The other reason for the failure of the policy of conditionality in Russia is the absence of
unity in the European Union in terms of dealing with Russia. The dependence of many of
European Union countries on Russian natural resources allows Russia to pursue the effective
“divide and rule” strategy, making bilateral agreements with some of the member states (Gower,
2008), (Gerrits, A. (ed), 2008). On their relationship with Russia, the EU member states are
divided into five groups: ‘Trojan Horses’, ‘Strategic Partners’, ‘Friendly Pragmatists’, ‘Frosty
Pragmatists’ and ‘New Cold Warriors’ (Leonard & Popescu, 2007). Each group sees Russia in a
different spectrum: from a potential partner who can be drawn to Europe to a real threat. ‘Trojan
Horses’ – Cyprus and Greece – voice the opinion of Russia in the European arena. ‘Strategic
Partners’ – Germany, France, Italy and Spain – pursue their own interest in the bilateral
agreements with Russia and neglect common strategy, which would be useless without their
support. ‘New Cold Warriors’ – Poland, Lithuania are most insistent on seeing Russia as a threat.
Other states are in between – they pursue their own interest in a manner that is more or less
friendly to Russia.
There are a few rational choice arguments mentioned in the debate about Russia’s non-
compliance to the rules of the EU. For instance, Russia’s prosperous financial state - as it has
enough money, it is not desperate for the EU’s help (Gower, 2008). Furthermore, it is argued that
since Russia does not have the aim to join the Union, the EU does not have concrete rewards that
could interest Russia enough to comply (Gormat, 2008), (Gerrits (ed), 2008).
Also mentioned is a distinct lack of possibilities for negative conditionality: as the EU
favors economic relationship over anything other, it is hard to imagine it uniting against Russia
and imposing sanctions over, for example, human rights violation (Gerrits (ed), 2008). In fact,
forcing conditionality on Russia might be even dangerous, as in addition to imposing extra costs
on Russian partners from the Member States, it will affect the possibilities of interacting with
Russia on the topic of international challenges such as climate change, Middle East conflict, etc.
(Schmidt-Felzmann, 2008).
As for the institutions that are established in the Russia-EU relationship (PCA, Common
Spaces), many authors agree that they were created with some kind of conditional leverage of the
EU over Russia. Article 55 of the PCA states that “Russia shall endeavor to ensure that its
legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community”. However, the PCA
now is regarded as an outdated document that does not fit in the current state of affairs between
the EU and Russia, and which focuses much more on technical issues and trade-related problems
rather than democratic transformation (Arbatova, 2007). Four Common Spaces and the Common
European Economic Space can be seen as an attempt to “operationalize” what have already been
vaguely stated in the PCA (Haukkala, 2009).  At first, the prospects of the Four Common Spaces
7seemed rather optimistic – as a way for Russia to “enjoy the benefits of the process of European
integration without participating in the political institutions of the EU” (Prozorov, 2006).
However, as time went by and little success has been shown, the institution was deemed as too
vague, “a proliferation of the fuzzy” (Emerson, 2005). Russia now rejects any suggestions of the
creation new institutions based on the conditionality to the EU norms and values. (Gower, 2008).
Theoretical framework
Most of the arguments made by scholars in the past have a rational ground. Yet the variety
of reasons proposed by different authors lack the systematic approach. In order to conduct a
comprehensive study of conditionality in Russia I am going to use the “external incentives
model” developed by Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier (The Europeanization of
Central and Eastern Europe, 2005), which incorporates the majority of the arguments that have
been voiced before, provides the room for discussing other viewpoints, and gives an order to the
studies of conditionality in the relationship between Russia and the EU.
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier explore the mechanism of conditionality that is used by
the European Union in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Although designed
for the CEECs that aspire to joining the European Union, this rational choice model can also be
used for explaining the progress (or lack thereof) of Europeanization in Russian Federation. The
general links and explanations that Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier provide when explaining
their model are rather universal, and can be used for studying conditionality not only within
Europe and the EU, but for any kind of institution that uses the policy of conditionality.
Moreover, conditional agreements between the EU and Russia have the same idea behind them
as any agreement between the EU and a potential candidate country. The EU expects the
countries to become more European in exchange for some kind of a reward. And while the exact
nature of the reward might differ, the principle stays intact.
It has to be noted that the concept “Europeanization” can be defined in several ways,
distinguishing the “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches. “Bottom up” Europeanization
explores the influence of the Member States on the EU policy. For the purposes of this research,
however, I am going to follow the “top down” definition, employed by Schiemmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, where Europeanization is a “process in which states adopt EU rules”.
As such, the dependant variable of the external incentives model is “rule adoption” – an
institutionalization of EU rules in the national legislation, changing national practices in favor of
those established by the EU, etc.
8The process of Europeanization can either be initiated by the EU or by the state itself.
States could also make decisions on the basis of two different types of logic: “logic of
consequences” (if we assume that states are rational actors that seek to maximize their profit) and
“logic of appropriateness” (if we assume that the decision is made on the base of internalized
identities and norms). Europeanization that is initiated by the EU and follows the “logic of
consequences” forms an “external incentives model”, which I am going to use in this thesis.
Two other models – “social learning model” (EU-induced Europeanization following the “logic
of appropriateness”) and “lesson-drawing model” (state-induced Europeanization, regardless of
the logic of rule adoption) are left out of this research. So far the policy of the EU towards
Russia was mainly conducted using the conditional approach, as it is mainly done through the
Four Common Spaces Agreement – a document similar to action plans within the ENP. The EU
does use a “social learning” method, especially in the research area, and that would be further
mentioned in this thesis. But since the EU is more inclined to directly engage with the state
actors, the external incentives model will be in the focus of my attention. Also, as my work is
predominantly focused on the efforts of the EU to Europeanize Russia, the lesson drawing
model, which is aimed towards studying the Europeanization driven from within the country, is
also not used.
The “external incentives model” is a rationalist bargaining model  (which incorporates  not
only advantages of the rational choice approach, but also the limitations such as sometimes
falsely assumed rationality of actors, failure to take into account cultural peculiarities, etc.). The
EU can motivate states to comply by offering assistance and institutional ties (in the Russian
case accession is out of question, so it is mostly just assistance and a promise of the ties with
Europe that do not require becoming politically attached to the EU – free trade, travel and
educational exchanges), which constitutes the essence of conditionality policy. European
Union’s conditionality is almost always “positive”, “reinforcement by reward” – the EU grants
the reward if the state complies with the condition, and those who do not are denied the
assistance. The EU almost never uses “reinforcement by punishment”, as it almost never offers
extra benefits. European Union conditionality upsets the internal “status quo” of the state, and
gives extra incentives to comply with the EU’s rule.
According to the model, the rule adoption depends on four factors: the size and speed of
the reward, the determinacy of the agreement’s rules, credibility of conditional threats and
promises and the veto players and adoption costs. Therefore four hypotheses can be made
regarding the likelihood of Russia adopting the EU rules.
1. The more determinate the rules of agreement are, the more likely Russia will
adopt the EU rules. Russia is more likely to adopt the EU rules if it is the condition of gaining
9the reward that Russia desires, and if the conditions of this agreement are very determinate.
When the rules of the game are detailed and straightforward, it is hard to cheat, because both of
the sides could check if the other is following their part of the agreement, and they both are
interested in doing so. Therefore, the likelihood of the EU conditionality being successful is
higher when the terms and conditions are written very clearly, as both of the sides will know the
rules of the game. The clearer the rules are, the easier it is for Russia to follow them and to hold
the EU accountable for supplying the reward after complying with all the steps. This hypothesis
also provides the room for discussing one of the explanations of the Russia’s non-compliance to
the EU conditions: the fact that Russia sees accepting conditions as a failure and a weakness
unacceptable for the strong country (Medvedev, 2008; Gower, 2008). During the analysis of the
hypothesis it would become apparent which conditions Russia does accept and why.
2. The bigger the reward and the faster it can be achieved, the more likely Russia
will adopt the EU rules.  If the reward is a very far-reaching goal, or not too important for
Russia, it will less likely comply with conditions and adopt the rules – because the reward will
not counterweight the efforts that Russia would have to make in order to carry out its part of the
deal. It is argued that in the absence of the possibility of Russian accession to the EU, the latter
fails to provide incentives strong enough and realistic enough to interest Russia in complying
with the conditions. Russia is not too interested in the direct financial aid, and other rewards
might not be interesting enough for Russia to start a substantial change. This argument is in
agreement with the position of Goward (2008), Gormat (2008) and Gerrits (2008), who all
explained the failure of policy of conditionality towards Russia by the absence of the adequate
reward.
3. The more credible the conditional threats and promises are, the more likely Russia
will adopt the EU rules. If Russia believes what the EU says (regarding the reward and
possibilities of punishment for not complying with the agreement), it is more likely to fulfill its
commitments. Credibility is subject to the influence from different factors. 1) Threats and
promises are more credible, if the EU does not lose too much from withholding the benefits and
does not gain too much from providing them to Russia. If the EU would give the reward to
Russia regardless of its compliance with the conditions, why would Russia comply at all?  For
the EU sometimes the costs of not cooperating with Russia are higher than the gain from sticking
to the terms of conditions (especially in economic cooperation), which is mentioned by Gerrits
(2008), as well as Schmidt-Felzmann (2008). If that leads to the EU not sticking to the rules they
approved themselves, conditional agreement would not work. 2) The EU threats and promises
are more credible, if previously the conditionality policy with other states was consistent, and if
there exist an internal consensus within the EU member states about conditionality policy
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towards Russia. If the EU consistently provides rewards for the same level of cooperation from
other states, not making any exceptions, then it would encourage Russia to comply with
conditions as the EU could be trusted to provide the reward. The EU does not have a stable track
record of providing rewards for the countries that seek neither accession, nor direct financial aid,
and it could influence Russia’s reluctance to adopt the rules. The EU is also not widely known
for its agreement on the policy towards Russia, which could also be a part of the non-compliance
problem (which is a point that is also made by Leonard and Popescu in “A Power Audit of EU-
Russia Relations” (2007), as well as Gerrits in “The European Union and Russia:Perceptions and
Interest in the Shaping of Relations”(2008)); 3) Credibility of EU’s threats and promises
decreases if Russia has other sources for gaining the same rewards (cross-conditionality) and
increases if Russia gains additional benefits for same conditions from other international actors
(parallel conditionality), or has compliance with the EU terms as a condition from other
international organizations  (additive conditionality). If Russia could get the same benefits that
the EU offers without complying with the EU conditions, it will likely do so, as it decreases the
cost of obtaining benefits. And if Russia is motivated with some extra rewards from other actors,
it would more likely comply with conditions and adopt the rules, as it would receive extra profit
for the same effort.  Sometimes single member States provide cross-conditionality with their
bilateral agreements with Russia. At the same time, for example, WTO provides extra incentives
within the common economic space – the accession to WTO is a condition to creating a Free
Trade Agreement. 4) The credibility is lower if the EU is not able to access the reliable
information about Russia’s compliance to its conditions. Despite the fact that the EU has its own
monitoring system, Russia could still hide important information regarding compliance to the
rules. The less transparent such compliance is, the more the EU is inclined to not trust the reports
and, consequently, withhold the reward. It could prove to be a problem in Russian case, as
Russian officials tend to create so-called “Potemkin’s villages” to keep up the good façade in the
absence of real progress.
4. The more there are veto players in Russia, and the higher the rule adoption costs
are, the less likely Russia will adopt the EU rules. Veto players are actors within Russia, who
would lose money or power over the process of Europeanization, and who have the ability to
stop this process (for example, corrupt officials that would lose their jobs and possibly be
prosecuted during the anti-corruption purges).  If someone has the power to prevent his own
losses, he most likely would do that. Russian politicians potentially have a lot to lose in the
process of Europeanization of the country: the progress in the human and civil rights area might
cost them their political power, as they would not be re-elected if the election process becomes
fair, and transparency and implementation of international norms could deprive them of their
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financial benefits, as the persistence of corruption is incompatible with Europeanization. The
absence of political will for carrying our reforms, which has been mentioned by Barysch (“Can
and Should the EU and Russia Reset Their Relationship?”, 2010) as one of the reasons for
Europeanization not being successful in Russia, fits perfectly into this hypothesis: as the power
and money of many powerful officials would evaporate with the reforms that Europeanization
requires, political will for such changes is absent.
It is important to say that the examination of the “veto players” independent variable poses
possible limitations on the research, as the actions of powerful elites are not well documented,
therefore it might prove difficult to find any concrete examples of the cases when they were the
reason for Russia’s non-compliance to the EU rules.
Research Methods
 As it was previously mentioned, the dependant variable in this research is “rule adoption”.
Independent variables are the following: “determinacy of conditions”, “size and speed of the
rewards”, “credibility of conditionality” and “veto players and adoption costs”.
Case selection and data sources are determined by the agreements signed by Russian
Federation and the European Union. Further in the thesis I will elaborate on the specifications of
the EU and Russia bilateral agreements, in particular Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
and Four Common Spaces Road Maps, which constitute the main conditional bilateral
agreements between the two sides. I am going to examine all of the areas of cooperation which
are mentioned in the Road Maps, paying particular attention to the parts of the agreement which
mention strong conditions and grand rewards. For example, I am going to closely examine the
cases that are linked to the possibility of creating the Free Trade Agreement (the whole are of
Common Economic Space), Visa Free Travel Agreement and the implementation of Bologna
process, as these examples provide for the most important rewards that the EU could currently
offer to Russia. However the focus on these areas does not prevent me from examining all other
cases that are mentioned in the Four Common Spaces Roadmaps, and they are included in the
main part of the thesis where it is appropriate.
One of the Four Common Spaces – a Space of External Security - is not being evaluated
regularly in the Annual Progress Reports, as the three other spaces do, since the cooperation
under this Common Space is considered to be an area of responsibility of the Common Foreign
Security Policy. Here, the reports are not as regular and detailed as reports on Common Spaces
and rarely include any relevant information. Therefore this area would be primarily excluded
from the examination. However, it should not have too big of an impact on the final results of the
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study since the text of a relevant Road Map does not include any conditional statements, and
does not include a promise of any substantial reward.
Data on the cases is going to be collected from the text of the Road Maps of Four Common
Spaces and the annual “EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Reports” of European
Commission, which provide comprehensive review of the progress made so far in the
implementation of the Four Common Spaces. The reports would allow me to see in which areas
the implementation of conditions is working, and in which it is not. Newspaper articles have a
possibility of helping to uncover veto players, as journalist investigations can go beyond what
the official reports could be allowed to tell due to different political reasons (e.g. not wanting to
contradict Russia directly, the EU reports might be much more reluctant to name the exact
players that influence the decision making process in Russia).
Conditional agreements between Russia and the EU
The cooperation between Russia and the EU is based on the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) between the two sides that was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1997.
Such agreements have also been concluded with Republic of Armenia, the Republic of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of
Moldova, Ukraine, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Partnership and Cooperation
agreements have several aims, among which is providing a framework for political dialogue,
supporting the countries’ efforts to establish stable democracies and accompany their transition
to market economy, as well as encourage investment and trade. In the PCA with Russia
conditions to the creation of a Free Trade Area are also mentioned.1
The PCA provides the grounds for laying out the conditions for Russia to harmonize its
legislation with that of the EU. The Article 55 of the Agreement states that “The Parties
recognize that an important condition for strengthening the economic links between Russia and
the Community is the approximation of legislation. Russia shall endeavor to ensure that its
legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community”2. However, the
implementation of this agreement has not been very successful and continued at a rather slow
1Europe.eu “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and
Central Asia”
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_centr
al_asia/r17002_en.htm
2 Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their
Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114138.pdf
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pace. By 2010 only one working group under the PCA remained active – the one on the customs
cooperation.
To give the relationship between the EU and Russia a boost, the EU suggested that Russia
should take part in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was created in 2004.  The
ENP is an instrument of the EU that has the aim of creating a deeper relationship with its
neighbors in order to create “an area of stability, prosperity and security”, and includes 16
neighbors of the EU. 3 In exchange for approximation of national legislation, the EU provides its
neighbors with “a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common
values”.4 This relationship is deeply conditional and includes political association, economic
integration, increased mobility and in some cases – the promise of the EU membership.
However, Russia refused to join the ENP. The official reason for that was that Russia did not
want to be seen as a mere “neighbor”, but rather as a strategic partner.
The EU and Russia decided to conclude an agreement outside the ENP, and created the
“Four Common Spaces” – framework for cooperation in four vast areas: Common Economic
Space; Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; Common Space of External Security;
Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects.
Despite the Four Common Spaces not formally being a part of an ENP, it is essentially
linked to it, as both programs are always closely associated, and are funded by the European
Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). The Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 for the
Russian Federation states that it “is based on the premise that the Common Spaces as the
definitive expression of the EU policy towards the Russian Federation, the wider EU
Neighborhood Policy, the EU Security Strategy and its development objectivities, are mutually-
reinforcing; and that together they make up a robust and coherent approach to Russia” [2007: 3].
The Four Common Spaces agreement includes the Road Maps – an alternative to the
Action Plan of the ENP. It includes steps and actions that Russia and the EU have to undertake in
order to deepen their cooperation. In practice, that the Common Spaces Agreement is a list of
obligations on the Russian side to “Europeanize” their legislation and harmonize it with
European standards in exchange to bringing the relationship between Russia and the EU to the
new level and providing for the free trade, travel and educational exchange. The EU also
provides Russia with technical assistance in implementing the reforms.
3Europe.eu “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and
Central Asia”
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_centr
al_asia/r17002_en.htm
4 European Commission “The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy ?”
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm
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The financial assistance is being provided through various instruments. To a larger extent,
the Four Common Spaces are being funded by the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument,
which was established in 2006. The first instrument, which is operational since 1991 and still
funds some of the projects in Russia, was TACIS - Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth
of Independent States.  Cross-border cooperation is funded mainly through European
Commission and Northern Dimension. Other institutions that provide financial assistance for the
Four Common Spaces projects include the Nuclear Safety Instrument, the Democracy and
Human Rights Instrument and a number of other thematic programs.5
Most of the bilateral relationship between Russia and the EU is conducted within a
framework of the Four Common Spaces, therefore in my thesis I will focus primarily on the
implementation of this agreement. Some other conditional agreements involving both Russia and
the EU exist, for example, the Georgia ceasefire plan, which was concluded in 2008 in order to
stop the war in South Ossetia. The agreement was proposed by the French president Nicolas
Sarkozy, who later warned Russia that if it did not comply with the terms of the agreement, it
would cause serious complications in the relationship with the EU.6 Furthermore, The European
Commission’s Progress Reports on the Implementation of the Road Maps specifically mentioned
this agreement and Russia’s reluctance to fully comply with its terms. Some sources claimed that
Russia had about three times more soldiers in South Ossetia than it did before the war. However
no actions have been taken against Russia from the EU, and as it is not the agreement that
concerns the relationship between Russia and the EU directly, it would not be in the focus of my
attention in this work.
Since 2008 there have been several rounds of negotiations between the EU and Russia to
conclude a new agreement that would replace the current PCA, but so far these negotiations have
not been successful – largely because the EU wants to place a more concrete conditionality in it,
but Russia is far more cautious to accepting conditions than it was in 1994.  The possibility of
concluding such a new agreement is also in question, since it would have to be operational  and it
also would have to be ratified by the parliament of all of the EU member states, which might be
difficult, and bring something that current PCA and Four Common Spaces could not. The goal of
creating such an agreement has not been achieved so far.
5 European Union External Action “Financial co-
operation”http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/financial_cooperation_en.htm
6 The Telegraph (2008) “West increases pressure on Russia over Georgia
withdrawal”http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2578001/West-increases-pressure-on-
Russia-over-Georgia-withdrawal.html
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Determinacy of the rules
In order to test the hypotheses that have been made for this research, I am going to examine
the proposed data sources (the text of the Road Maps and annual progress reports) and analyze
relevant information.  The first hypothesis suggests that determinacy of the rules and conditions
could positively influence the rule adoption.
 Indeed, if the conditions agreed to are clear and straightforward, it is much easier to
determine whether the sides have fulfilled their obligations. Therefore, if the conditions in the
EU-Russia agreements are clear and determinate, it is possible for the EU to point out the exact
shortcomings that keep Russia from receiving rewards, and, on the other side, Russia is able to
demand its rewards with more reliability, as it can clearly show that all the conditions were
fulfilled.
Within the Four Common Spaces agreement between Russia and the EU it is impossible to
talk about clarity of the rules and conditions. The text of “Road maps” is worded in such a
manner that, while conditionality of the agreement is implied, the exact terms are spelled out
very vaguely.
The Common Economic Space (CES) is the only one of the Four Spaces that actually has
the word “condition” in the text of the agreement. In the preamble to the Road Map for the
Common Economic Space the objective (i.e. reward) and the aim of the Road Map are stated.
The aim of the CES is “to put in place conditions which will increase opportunities for economic
operators, promote trade and investment, facilitate the establishment and operation of companies
on a reciprocal basis, strengthen cooperation in the field of energy, transport, agriculture and
environment, reinforce economic cooperation and reforms and enhance the competitiveness of
the EU and Russian economies, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and
good governance and taking into account the business dialogue undertaken within the EU-Russia
Industrialists’ Round Table”. In short, the CES is created to state the conditions, fulfillment of
which will lead to the creation of the Free Trade Agreement between Russia and the EU.
The conditions themselves, however, are rather unclear. From the actual, easily
distinguished conditions I could single out the demand to harmonize legislation, technical
regulations and certification requirements in the fields of automotive industry, textiles,
pharmaceuticals, public procurement; intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights;
competition; agriculture, forestry, timber, fisheries; trade facilitation and customs; transport. In
the environmental dialogue there is also a request for compliance with the UNECE convention
on trans-boundary environmental impact assessment (environment), UN Convention of the Law
of the Sea and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area (Helsinki Convention).  The strongest conditionality in the text of the Road maps for the
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CES is in the area of Trade Facilitation and Customs – it is the only area that states clear actions
that, when implemented, would fulfill conditionality obligations. These actions are:
simplification of customs procedures, harmonization of legislation with international standards,
improving administrative capacity so it would be able to facilitate the trade and the fight against
illicit trafficking, establishing the dialogue with the relevant stakeholders to exchange
information and simplify the trade-related legislation, and developing technical assistance
programs to improve customs technologies and procedures. Conditions in other areas are worded
very vaguely, with the likes of “continuing cooperation in the sphere”, “establishing the
dialogue”, “continuing the negotiations on”, “provide appropriate environment for”, “exchange
the information on”, etc. In reality to check and confidently argue that such conditions are
fulfilled is almost impossible.
In the preamble to the Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice
(CSFSJ) the word “conditions” is not mentioned in the context of the whole space, however it is
mentioned in relation to the visa free travel. The objective of the space is “building a new Europe
without dividing lines, thus facilitating travel between all Europeans”. In relation to that it is
proposed “to examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective”. The overall
aim of the CSFSJ is, however, not stated at all.
The implied conditions under this Space are stated in the names of sub-paragraphs: to
facilitate the movement of persons, to cooperate in border issues, to support an efficient
migration policy, to develop cooperation in the field of asylum policy, to fight against terrorism,
to improve the security of documents, to combat transnational organized crime, to promote
comprehensive anti-laundering regime, to solve narcotic drug problem, to combat trafficking in
human beings, to fight corruption, to improve the efficiency of the judicial system, etc. Actions
under the CSFSJ are more straightforward than that of the CES, and mainly focus on the
establishment, implementation and ratification of various international agreements.  In the area
of migration policy: the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air; in
asylum policy -  the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and i.a. its 1967
Protocol; fight against terrorism - 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, Joint
Statement on the fight against terrorism from the EU – Russia summit in 2002, International
Convention Against Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the agreement on cooperation between Europol
and the Russian Federation, Memorandum of Understanding on the fight against terrorism
between the EU and Russia; in combating transnational organized crime - the EU-Russia Action
Plan on Organized Crime and agreed priorities and the UN Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime; in fight against corruption -  UN and Council of Europe conventions on
corruption, including the UN Convention against Corruption, etc..  Other concrete steps include
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demarcating borders between the EU Member States and Russia (the ones that are not yet
demarcated), developing appropriate legislation (migration policy, anti-money laundering).
Other actions are very vague – “exchange of information”, “develop cooperation”, etc. It is
important to mention, however, that conditions mentioned in the Road Maps under this space are
a lot more straightforward that those of the CES.
The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security (CSES) is ever more vague in
its preamble – the cooperation under this Space has the aim of “strengthening international peace
and stability … creating favorable external conditions for security and prosperity in the European
Union and Russia” (36).  Implied conditions are also stated in the names of the cooperation areas
(e.g. fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction), but the actions
under these conditions are extremely unclear and are formulated in terms of “dialogue”,
“cooperation” and “enhancement of ongoing work”.
The Road Map for the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural
Aspects (CSRE) is more specific than the previous one, but also does not include the word
“conditions”. It does, however, state in its objectivities that this Common Space aims to
“intensify links and exchanges in the fields of education, youth and culture and promote the
identification and adoption of best practices.”(45)
Straightforward conditions, however, can be found only under the Education sphere of
cooperation, and include adoption of two-tier “bachelor-master” (with perspective of it evolving into
“bachelor-master-doctorate”) educational system, introducing credit system (ECTS), introducing
integrated curricula at the higher education institutions, etc. Culture and Research spheres are
determined more vaguely, aiming towards social learning model, rather than external incentives one
– for example, one of the objectivities of the Culture sphere is “to strengthen and enhance the
European identity on the basis of common values”.(52)
Annual Progress Reports on the implementation of the Four Common Spaces agreements bring
more clarity to the EU demands in the sphere of Economy, the Commission not being constrained by
the necessity of having them agreed on with the Russian side. Notably, the progress report on the
CES usually constitutes ¾ of the report for all four Common Spaces.
In the framework of industry-related dialogue within the CES, the EU poses a number of highly
specific demands: in the automobile area the EU wants Russia to protect the intellectual property
rights and take measures to prevent the counterfeit of spare parts, as well as ensuring automatic
recognition of the EU certification results; in textile – for Russia to harmonize the standards with
international ones, as well as use the same testing system and the same customs regulations as the
EU. The harmonization of legislation and technical standards are also demanded in the Electrical
equipment and machinery; ICT, Radio and Telecom; Construction products; Forest-based industries.
Protection of intellectual property rights are of the main concern in pharmaceuticals. Despite placing
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demands on specific rules and regulations, however, in the time span of five years, from 2005 till
2010, the dialogue on the industry-related issues did not bring any fruitful results. All the reports
acknowledge that the Russian Federation is eager to share information, but when it comes to the
actions – they rarely take place. Among the actual results of the cooperation – only Russia taking into
account technical regulations on children’s goods (in the textile industry) and adoption of European
standards related to the identification of mobile phones (ICT, Radio and Telecom). And even if
Russia claims its readiness to create new legislation that conforms to the European standards, it can
later change its opinion. This happened with Russia’s law on chemicals: initially it was supposed to
be designed in a way that conforms with European REACH (Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization and Restriction of Chemical substances, the EU law introduced in 2007) standards,
but later on it became apparent that Russia did not want to abolish the current system of “conformity
assessment”, and the new draft of the law only took account of the GHS (Globally Harmonized
System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals, standards, endorsed by the UN).
In the trade-related dialogue the EU’s main demands lie in the area of improving the
intellectual property rights situation, simplifying administrative procedures for investments and
bringing Russia’s public procurement regime in accordance to the European standards. Yet the
improvement has only been detected in the IPR, since Russian law enforcement authorities
conducted numerous raids throughout the whole country, and IPR crimes were moved into the
category of “grave crimes”. The investment regime remains hostile, even with a lot of support that
the EU puts into the related projects.
The customs cooperation, which conditionality was the strongest in the text of the agreement,
was not overly successful either. The EU’s main concern is long queues of lorries, which are crossing
the EU’s border with Russia. While in 2009-2010 the reports acknowledged the decrease of the
waiting time on the border, it was mainly attributed to the consequences of the world economy crisis
and the decrease in trade, not the efficiency of measures taken, as Russia did not manage to use to its
full capacity the new system of information exchange that was introduced within a pilot project on
“Modernisation of the Customs Transit System”. A new law on customs control was introduced, but
could not be enforced as Russia until 2009 failed to introduce additional decrees that were needed to
implement it, and after that delayed the transition to the “two-agency” system.
On the contrary, the cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary issues had a very weak
conditionality in the text of the agreement, but this is the area where the EU arguably achieved
the most success within the CES.  Over the course of years Russia lifted the ban on Polish meat
and plants not for human consumption, accepted some of the EU standards and certification
procedures (on the EU exports of animals and animal products, on pesticides, on meat and meat
products deliveries, etc).
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Another example of the strong conditionality is seen in the dialogue on transport – air transport
in particular. The EU refused to conduct any cooperation with Russia in this area until it abolishes
Siberian Overflights’ discriminatory tariffs. According to these tariffs, all EU companies had to pay a
rent for permission to fly over Siberia on their way to Asian countries. Russia, however, insisted that
it would abolish these tariffs only if its accession to the WTO is approved. The dialogue on air
transport was in a deadlock until December 2011, when Russia became a WTO member and
consequently signed Siberian Overflights’ agreement.
The same strong conditionality was attributed to the issue of the EU designation. For a long
time Russia was almost the only country that did not accept the principle that any EU carrier could
fly from any of the EU Member States to non-EU countries if the bilateral agreements between
these countries contain traffic rights. Russia’s agreement to this principle was also a strong
condition of further cooperation, but it was not achieved until 2011 (preceding Russia’s WTO
accession).
Therefore, CES, while having a weak conditionality in the text of agreement, had some of
the very strong demands from the EU part. Stronger conditionality however did not lead to better
results.
In the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice conditions were of a stronger
matter, probably the strongest of the four spaces. In the progress reports, the strongest
conditionality is placed on Russia’s introduction and implementation of the national data
protection legislation: the EU is ready to discuss the operational agreement between Russia and
Europol only after fulfillment of that obligation. Yet no progress has been made in this area.
However, there has been a major achievement in the visa dialogue. In December 2011,
Russia and the EU agreed on the joint steps towards the visa-free regime. It is of a great
importance that the main problem about these steps is that Russia insisted that upon completion
of these steps the visa-free regime would enter into force automatically, while the EU insisted
that transition to the visa-free regime would depend on Russia’s devotion to the common values
– i.e. human rights protection. Therefore Russia wanted to make sure that the conditions were as
clear as possible so the EU could not deny it the right to visa-free travel. As of now, these steps
mostly include not ideological, but technical requirements: introduction of biometrical passports,
measures against illegal immigration, etc.
Additionally, every report on this common space starts with the concerns that the EU has
about the situation with human rights in Russia. Yet, no conditions or demands in this area are
placed in either the text of the Road Map or the Annual reports.
In the CSRE the main focus of the regulations is on the education in both road maps and
annual reports. In order to bring education in Russia to European standards, the implementation
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of Bologna process is demanded. In addition to being one of the strongest conditionality cases,
education is arguably one of the areas where the compliance to the rules occurs to the greater
extent. Russia has already introduced the two-level educational system (although the three-level
system has not yet been touched upon) and is currently in the transition process to fully
implementing it. There are obligations that are yet to be fulfilled, like introducing credits system
(which is already in the process: in 2011 some of the graduates received their diplomas with the
credits for each course already included) but the Russian side seems to be determined to
complete the transition. Two other big parts of the common space – the culture and the research
– seem to be more of a cooperational nature, the one that better fits into the social learning
model. In the research especially, the EU does its best to engage Russian scientists in the work
with their European counterparts in order to promote collaboration for the mutual benefit. The
culture area does have a conditionality aspect – the EU wants Russia to sign and ratify UNESCO
convention on the protection of the diversity of cultural expressions, however no results have
been achieved in that area.
One of the reasons for conditional terms being so vague is that Russia is very opposed to
the idea of conditionality in general, since it goes against the image that it wants to portray.
Russia refuses to be seen as a country that allows anyone else to dictate conditions, dictate the
way that Russia is supposed to follow. This reasoning was beyond the refusal to join European
Neighborhood Policy – Russia was explicitly stating that it does not want to be seen as a mere
neighbor, but rather as an equal partner.
However, I would suggest that the image is not the real reason behind that. In fact, Russia
is more than willing to accept strong conditions in the areas that hold the most meaning to it –
visa-free regime and education. In the case of visa-free regime it even insists on the conditions to
be strong, which goes along perfectly with the hypothesis that we are testing: Russia is afraid
that the EU would withhold the reward. However, in most cases Russia uses the image argument
in order to reject the conditions that it sees as unfavorable, which seems to be the reason why no
direct conditions on the human rights situation were placed. And if the EU insists on having
some of the conditions included in the agreement anyway, Russia does its best in order to
emasculate the essence of the agreement. In case of the Four Common Spaces agreement the EU
was too interested in signing the document that it allowed such processes – it seems that the EU
would take the weak “Europeanization” agreement with Russia over no agreement at all.
It appears that the mere fact of having strong or weak conditions does not seem to have a
direct impact on the rule adoption: we have a set of strong conditions that are not being complied
with (especially in the CSFSJ), and we have considerably weak conditions that lead to a greater
compliance (mostly in the CES).  And while two of the cases (visa-free travel and education) are
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in agreement with the initial hypothesis, it is apparent that its influence on the overall outcome is
not too strong.
The size and speed of the reward
One of the main “rationalist” explanations of the Russia’s non-compliance to the EU’s
conditions is the absence of the reward that would be interesting enough for Russia to achieve.
Indeed, in the absence of the possibility (or desire from either sides) of accession to the European
Union, it is hard to imagine the reason that would be as compelling, as the EU membership for
many of the ENP countries.
The first important issue with the conditions under the Common Spaces agreement is that it
is not in essence a single agreement, but rather four different documents. They are not united
under some big reward that is achieved after complying with all of the agreements. No, it has a
bigger reward as a result of complying with one of the spaces’ conditions at best (see CES), but
more often, with only one area of one of the Common Spaces. While it heightens the chances of
this particular area to be implemented, it also lowers the chances of compliance to the conditions
of the whole agreement.
Only one Common Space has an objective of achieving the big final reward – “creation of
an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia” [Road Maps, 2005: 1]. In annual
progress reports it is stated that if Russia is to comply with the conditions to the Common
Economic Space, it can potentially lead to development of the Free Trade Agreement. The EU is
Russia’s largest trading partner, and the completion of such an agreement would be indisputably
beneficial to Russian Federation. However the particular phrasing of it, “possible future
conclusion of a deep Free Trade Agreement” [Progress report, 2008: 5], and the fact that the
conclusion of such an agreement is condition upon Russia’s accession to WTO, indicates that it
is more of a long-term perspective, and is something not achieved too easily.
Other rewards for the CES include economic assistance, technical expertise and
organization of educational programs and seminars. Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth
of Independent States (TACIS), Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument
(TAIEX) and Common Spaces Facility (CSF, an institution created in 2008 for financing
initiatives under Common Spaces) are the major tools which the EU uses to implement its
programs. Throughout the years, Russia received through these institutes €2.5 million for
"Approximation of EU and RF technical regulation, standardisation and certification systems",
€2 Million for an e-government project, €7 million for an administrative capacity building
project in Kaliningrad, €2.6 million for the project on Insurance Sector Development, €3 Million
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for the project on the “Reform of Public Procurement”, €600 000 for the Enhancement of
Management of the Russian Border Checkpoints, €800 000 for the “State Aid and Corruption
Risk Management” program, etc. The overall amount of financial support mentioned in the
annual reports equals almost €140 million. The area that received the most economic support is
environmental dialogue – about €70 million, which might indicate that the EU was trying to
interest Russia in changing its policy in that sphere. Environmental issues are very important to
the EU (especially its Northern states, which share climate and environment with Russia), but are
not very high on the Russian agenda. This is also the area in which the EU cannot offer any other
rewards other than financial ones.
The EU organized trainings and workshops for officials and specialists in the fields of
pharmacy, e-government, the fight against internet piracy, public procurement, competition,
audit, marine transport and veterinary. TAIEX has organized seminars on standardization, public
procurement, customs infrastructure, competition legislation, veterinary issues, multi-level
governance and institutional capacity.
The areas under the CES with the strongest conditionality – Customs Cooperation and
Aviation do not have a strong additional reward, having only “further cooperation” as a final
result of fulfilling conditions, and so they remained in the stalemate (until 2011, when aviation
issue was resolved as a part of Russia’s WTO accession process – a case of parallel
conditionality, which would be dealt with in the following chapter).
In the CSFSJ there are three main areas – Freedom, Security and Justice. The objectivity of
the agreement is creating “a new Europe without dividing lines”, and the possibility of a big
reward – a visa-free travel – is specifically mentioned in the preamble to the Road Map of this
common space. However later in the agreement the grand reward is attributed only to the
Freedom – one of the three areas under this Space. Security and Justice areas include direct
requirements, but do not have their own big rewards are not linked to the potential visa-free
agreement.   Security area does place a rather strong conditionality on the potential cooperation
between Europol and Russian law enforcement agencies, and provide additional motivation in
form of supply contracts for electronic monitoring and tracking equipment, but it is not
significant compared to the abolition of visas.
Visa-free agreement in the text of the Road Map is mentioned as a “long-term perspective”,
and the conditions for it were only supposed to be discussed. However, since 2005, a big
progress in the area has been made.  In December 2011, the parties agreed on the common steps
to the visa-free agreement. It is too soon to speak of Russia’s compliance or non-compliance to
these steps yet, but Russian authorities have already voiced their desire to fulfill the conditions
by 2014 – a year when the Winter Olympic Games are being held in a Russian city, Sochi.
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Abolition of the visa regime has a big importance not only convenience- but also image-vise.
Therefore, as of now, it no longer seems like a distant perspective – although, some experts
suggest that the EU would hesitate to open its borders for Russia even upon fulfillment of
conditions (and that is why Russia insists on making them as clear as possible).
The CSREC space also is majorly divided upon three areas – Research, Education and
Culture. The biggest reward is attributed to the Educational area – becoming a part of Bologna
process and fulfilling obligations attributed to it would enable easy educational exchanges,
possibility to trade ideas, which will lead to the increase of attractiveness of Russian
Universities, higher value of Russian graduates on the labor market, better quality of education.
As Russian education is in the state of crisis – Soviet methods are no longer relevant, and
European methods are not yet implemented – the state is in the desperate need of educational
reform, and Bologna process is able to help with it. Additionally, the Bologna requirements are
incredibly technical, and do not require any additional political changes, so they can be
implemented (and are being implemented) quite quickly, making the major reward relatively
easy to achieve.
Concluding the findings of this area, it is important to note that the financial cooperation is
not the most influential stimulus in the EU’s arsenal. In fact, as a part of building an image of a
superpower Russia dislikes receiving direct financial help, preferring to work on the programs
that are financed by both sides (although, the EU takes upon the bigger part of expenses).
Besides, the EU is unable to present the amount of financial support that would potentially
interest Russia, as Russian economy has been blooming, even when taking into account the
recent setback related to the international financial crisis. As a lot of experts have previously
noticed, Russia is not a desperately poor country, therefore it is a highly improbable task to
interest RF with money – however, it could serve as an additional motive. Technical expertise
and educational programs, however, are of a more valuable matter, since Russia lacks experience
in the Europeanization reforms area.
The most compelling major rewards of the Agreement are the ones that involve attaching
Russia to the EU in a way close to the states that desire accession, but do not require major
political changes. Uniting with Europe in the areas of economy, travel and education is
compelling because it provides conditions that would benefit Russia, yet without the need to
carry the burden of being suitable for Europe in any other areas. The speed of the reward also
plays a major role – cooperation in education is by far the most fruitful one, since it is achievable
in a short time period. Visa abolition dialogue is now also progressing very quickly because the
Russian side believes it to be achievable in two years. Free Trade Agreement, however
compelling the size of a reward is, is still a distant deal, since too much is required for it to
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happen. As a result, Russia’s compliance to the conditions under the CES, although existent,
does not seem too enthusiastic.
All in all, this independent variable – the size and speed of a reward - seem to directly
affect the cases of rule adoption.
Credibility of conditional threats and promises
In order for the conditionality policy to be effective, the receiving state has to be sure that
the EU will keep its promises and threats. Credibility is based on several things; among them are
the costs of awarding and withholding rewards, consistency and internal agreement about the
policy within the EU, the presence or absence of cross, additive and parallel conditionality and
the reliability of information about the progress of the implementation of the agreement.
The credibility of the threats and promises relies on the cost of awarding or withholding
rewards. Essentially, in this case, it means that Russia would be more obedient to the rules if the
EU did not have any particular extra incentives to give the reward regardless of the state of
compliance with the rules. At the same time, Russia should be sure that it would be too costly for
the EU to withhold the reward in case of compliance to the rules.
This rule is rather straightforward with the countries that desire accession to the EU. The
EU, as a rule, is not too dependent on these countries, so it is in the position of power and
therefore, can easily withhold the grand reward – the membership in the organization. Credibility
of the reward comes with achieving a status of official Candidate and starting the official
negotiations on the membership process.
Both of these are impossible in Russia’s case. First of all, not only is the EU Russia’s
largest trading partner, but Russia is also the EU’s third largest trade partner7. This is mainly due
to the natural resources supply from Russia, especially gas and oil. In 2007 Russia was
responsible for about 39 percent of the EU’s natural gas and 32% of oil import8. The EU is
deeply dependent on Russia’s natural resources, which makes it more eager to cooperate. For
example, the EU opened the visa-free negotiations with Russia regardless of the fact that in the
same Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, big violations of human rights in Russia
are being discussed.
The credibility of rewards cost-wise is rather questionable at the moment. On the one hand,
the Free Trade agreement is still a very long-term perspective, mostly because Russia is not even
close to fulfilling its obligations regarding harmonization of legislation, suspending
7 European Union External Action “Russia” http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/index_en.htm
8 Energy Dialogue EU-Russia (2009) Tenth progress report
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/russia/doc/reports/progress10_en.pdf
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administrative barriers, etc.  On the other hand, Russia’s WTO accession, which was confirmed
in December 2011 and will take place in autumn 2012, creates a new set of opportunities
regarding Free Trade negotiations, as WTO membership was a precondition to starting these
talks. The credibility of a visa free agreement and Bologna process agreement is rather high, as
the negotiations on the former already has been started, and the latter is currently being
implemented. It would be rather costly for the EU to withhold the rewards upon completion of
the terms of agreement.
The consistency of the rewards can be hard to determine. In the case of states that desire
the EU accession, consistency of the rewards means that all the states get the same reward (the
EU membership) upon completing the same set of conditions. Russia, however, is not set upon
that task. In fact, the Russian case is very unique in that sense. Out of all states that the EU has
association agreements - under Stabilization and Association Process (Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) and European
Neighborhood Policy (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel,
the Palestinian Authority, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus) only
Russia and Belarus are the countries that potentially have a right to join the EU but did not
express that desire. And taking into account the fact that the relationship between the EU and
Belarus are almost non-existent at the moment because the EU considers Belarus undemocratic,
Russia remains the only country under such agreement that is situated in Europe but is not an EU
candidate or potential candidate.  It remains unclear, should the consistency of providing the
rewards be judged by the countries that are situated in the same continent and share the same
institutions, or should it be judged by the countries that are situated elsewhere and mostly
communicate with the EU in trade relations, and the EU does not have particular desire to
“Europeanize” them.
If we decide to judge the consistency of the policy that is being implemented towards
Russia, then it is rather consistent so far. In the cases of strict conditionality, where the EU gave
Russia ultimatum, it never backed down before the conditions were fulfilled. Relations in the
aviation sector were virtually paralyzed until Russia suspended Siberian Overflights tariffs as a
part of the WTO accession agreement. The negotiations on the Free Trade agreement have also
not been started as WTO accession was a precondition for it. Financial assistance has been
provided on a regular basis, as well as traineeships and seminars. At the same time, the start of
negotiations on the Visa Free travel was seen by some of the EU members as a step that is not
consistent with the policy, as it was virtually granting an award (or drastically increasing the
chances of receiving one) for nothing, since no great improvements in the area of Freedom,
Security and Justice were made.
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Regarding the internal agreement on the policy towards Russia, the EU cannot be any less
united.  As many scholars have already noted, the EU is not able to agree whether it should be
stricter with Russia, or it should try to involve Russia in common institutions as much as possible
and hope that it would change by learning from the EU example. According to Leonard and
Popescu (2007), the EU member states are divided into five categories, which all see Russia
differently – whether it is a “strategic partner” or potential threat. Russia prefers to maintain such
position and struck deals with big countries like Germany and France, as without their consent it
would be impossible to agree on a common strategy. It has especially been apparent in the recent
dialogue about visa-free agreement. There is no unity within the EU regarding how fast this
process should go, and whether the EU should make Russia work for the visa-free agreement as
hard as it is possible, or it should be more willing to open its borders, and hope that it will lead to
Europeanization through constant contact of cultures. The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany
are in favor of a more strict approach, while Greece and Spain are more willing to open the
borders since they are most likely to benefit from the tourist flow. Likewise, not all the players
within the Member States support the same position. For example, businessmen and diplomats
are generally in favor of a quick liberalization of visa regime9, while law enforcement agencies
are generally against the idea.10 It is also unclear whether Russia could or should gain visa
waiver privileges before two other states, Ukraine and Moldova, which concluded such
agreements before Russia, and which desire the EU accession.
Credibility of threats and rewards also decreases with the existence of cross-conditionality,
which is a situation in which the state can receive the same benefits from other source with less
strict conditions. In the case of the EU-Russia relationship, strictly speaking, such cross-
conditionality does not exist: Russia cannot get a visa-free travel with the EU anywhere else
except within the framework of EU-Russia relations, the same goes for Free Trade Agreement
and Bologna process. However, in the minor details bilateral agreements with the Member States
can gain Russia benefits that would not be possible to gain in the dialogue with the Union as a
whole. For example, Russia and Germany managed to implement the Nord Stream Pipeline
project, which further deepens the EU dependence on Russian gas, and at the same time benefits
Germany, as it gets the gas without resellers and gets to charge other EU countries for
transferring the gas within the EU.
Russia’s WTO accession is an example of a parallel and additive conditionality. A lot of
the regulations which were of a primal concern to the EU (including Siberian Overflights rates
9 Cordes, Eckhard (2011) Position Paper: Roads to Visa-free Travel. Committee on Eastern European Economic
Relations, Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations http://www.ost-
ausschuss.de/sites/default/files/pm_pdf/Position%20Paper%20Roads%20to%20Visa-free%20Travel_0.pdf
10 Popescu, Nicu (2011) “On EU-Russia visa-free travel” http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2011/10/26/on-eu-
russia-visa-free-travel-part-2/
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and tariffs on the wood export from Russia) were the subject of negotiations upon Russia’s WTO
accession, which makes it a case of additive conditionality. However, Russia’s WTO accession
(and fulfilling conditions that WTO posed on Russia) was also a precondition to the start of the
talks on the Free Trade Agreement, which makes it the case of parallel conditionality. Upon the
decision on Russia’s accession, the EU and Russia signed several agreements, resolving their
issues regarding Russia’s wood export tariffs, raw materials and trade of parts and components
of motor vehicles, as well as Siberian Overflights and European Designation problem.11
Regarding the quality of information on the compliance to the conditions, this particular
problem has not been mentioned in the reports. It was, however, mentioned that Russian
authorities are particularly big on the talk, but do not wish to extend their promises to the real
actions (especially in the industry-related dialogue, where this problem is mentioned in every
progress report). However, such state of affairs does not prevent the EU from gaining realistic
picture of the implementation of the agreement, which essentially results in critical opinion
voiced in the text of the reports.
All in all, credibility of threats and promises of the EU seems rather plausible. The EU
withholds the rewards and awards them if it strictly promised to do so. However, in the situations
where the rules are not as clear, the uncertainty of policy application remains. It is mainly due to
the internal disagreement on the approach towards Russian Federation within the EU Member
States, which also affects consistency of the policy and leads to cross-conditionality to a certain
extent.  A general dependency of the EU on Russia’s natural resources also plays its role in
determining the credibility of promises. WTO parallel and additive conditionality played a big
role in the EU-Russia relationship, since the actual accession conditions of WTO are stricter, and
the rewards are bigger (accession to the organization as opposed to association in the case of the
EU). Russia was more willing to obey the WTO conditions, which brought positive results in the
EU-Russia relationship as well. The quality of information does not seem to affect the policy, as,
while Russia does not necessarily prefer to give all the information, the EU has enough means to
ensure that it has comprehensive information about the state of Russia’s compliance to the
conditions.
Veto players
Sometimes, especially in the authoritarian regimes, the veto-players – people of power and
money who have an influence over the decision-making process, and who are at risk of losing
11 European Commission Trade: Russia http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/russia/
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their position in the society in the process of Europeanization, play a major role in preventing
such processes from taking place. For example, in their work Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
conclude that Belarus was a classic example where the authoritarian regime was consolidated
enough to suppress democratization and Europeanization process [2005: 214]. Likewise, Nicu
Popescu expresses the opinion that in case the EU would demand stricter conditions for the visa-
free travel, Russian authorities simply would not agree to fulfill them, as they themselves do not
have any problems with getting a visa to other countries, and they would not risk losing their
power and position in attempts to grant common citizens the right to travel to Europe without
restrictions.12
However, such claims are hard to prove. In essence, it is impossible to prove that a certain
politician, businessman or organization is against one or another policy rule. Therefore in this
chapter I will elaborate on veto-players that are explicitly mentioned in progress reports as forces
that stand against the implementation of certain conditions, and then focus on the researcher’s
angle on this issue.
The section dedicated to the industrial dialogue of the ICT, Radio and Telecom in 2008
progress report mentioned that, while Russia makes some progress in that area by applying
European standards related to the identification of mobile phones, it is impossible to resolve the
main issue in this sphere – encryption – because it is Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB, a
Federal Security Service, a successor of KGB) who makes decisions on this matter and not
Ministry of Telecommunication, which is the official negotiations partner of the EU.
Encryption is a process of encoding the data in a way that it can be transmitted
anonymously and be decoded only by those who have a special key to the code. Russia has
already had the problem in the past, where it has complained about the fact that Skype and
Google Mail encryption codes are not available to the FSB, which, according to them, was an
obstacle in the fight against organized crime, since criminals use these services in their
communication and FSB is unable to detect them. Russia demanded Microsoft to hand them the
encryption codes, but the request was denied, which caused Russia to threaten to close down
these services in Russia altogether. That, of course, did not happen13 and FSB lately said that it
aims for regulating the services, not closing them, but this incident indicates the importance of
the issue to Russian Federation.
If Russia was to implement the same encryption standards as the EU, it would mean that
FSB could no longer ask for more information that is provided by European standards, and also
12 Popescu, Nicu (2011) “On EU-Russia visa-free travel” http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2011/10/26/on-eu-
russia-visa-free-travel-part-2/
13 Schwartz, Mathew J.  (2011) “Russia Reverses Plan To Ban Encrypted Web Services”
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/encryption/229401362
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could not conceal the information that they want to hide as effectively. Therefore, FSB
effectively blocks development in that area, and the EU has no chance to persuade them because
the ministry that they are dealing with on a day-to-day basis is not the leading decision-making
actor in that area.
Other veto players that were explicitly mentioned in the reports include the Minister of
Economy of Kaliningrad region, who was rather critical to the independent IPA and therefore
blocked the implementation of the project on “Development of financial markets” in 2008 [2008:
11]. The position of Minister of Health was named as one of the reasons of the lack of progress
in the relationship in the Pharmaceuticals area in 2007 [2007: 7]. However these issues are
difficult to elaborate since the reports do not go into details and research in the mass media also
does not provide the answer what exactly these officials were opposed to.
The Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for the Russian Federation also include the
acknowledgement that not everybody in Russia shares European values and view on what
constitutes a prosperous Federation: accountable institutions, independent judiciary, strong civil
society and a free market economy.  The pessimistic prediction of some experts was that the
bureaucracy in Russia will handicap all the reform efforts.
As to the other sources, reports are generally wary of naming exact names. For instance,
the new report of European Union Institute of Security Studies “Russia – Insights from a
changing country” presents the concept of “collective Putin” that prevents Russia from
Europeanization. According to this report, “collective Putin” is the group of people that
accompanied the newly elected president of Russia during his various stages of life – studying in
St. Petersburg State University, career in KGB and St. Petersburg administration. The report
acknowledges that, for example, the energy sector was run by the same people for a very long
time regardless of their formal position, and they would not permit any kind of substantial
changes in order to not lose control over the industry. State-owned companies along with private
ones that are linked to the “collective Putin” (such as Gennady Timchenko’s “Novatec”) enjoy
privileges like tax exemptions and licensing access, which would not be possible if Russia, for
example, made a serious and comprehensive attempt on eliminating corruption. The problem is
that the power in Russia is too focused on the leading figure, Vladimir Putin, and for him to start
political reform would mean to bankrupt his closest friends and partners [2012: 38]. The report
by Cynthia A. Roberts “Russia and the European Union: The Sources and Limits of “Special
Relationships” also indicates the presence of veto players that block Europeanization, but fails to
provide specific names [2007: 8].
All in all, this hypothesis about the influence of veto-payers on the rule adoption is perhaps
the hardest to prove. It is understandable since the whole notion of a veto player does not imply
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transparency or the existence of verification documents of any kind. However, in all the cases
that were explicitly mentioned in the reports cooperation did not produce any fruitful results.
It has also been widely accepted that there are elite groups of the higher ranked officials,
which enjoy privileges and special conditions that would be impossible to gain in the country
with European Standards being fully embodied in the legislation. Therefore these actors prevent
such changes using their position of power in order to maintain their privileges. The reluctance
of the reports to name specific names might be attributed to the inability of proving the
accusations of corruption, and especially the link between corrupt officials and the poor
implementation of conditional agreements between Russia and the EU.
Therefore it could be concluded that the hypothesis does work in the Russian case, but the
links are hard to establish in a definite way.
Conclusion
In the beginning of this thesis, I posed several questions, which after doing the research are
now possible to answer.
The main research question was – why is Russia not complying with the conditions that the
EU are posing? A quick answer would be – it does not want to. Russia is not motivated enough
to undergo a tough, long process of Europeanization that would surely end in a lot of official and
unofficial leaders losing their power and money.
Out of all the four hypotheses that were presented in the beginning, two of them appear to
be the most important: dependency of the rule adoption on the size and speed of the rewards, and
on the presence of a large amount of veto-players, who are powerful enough to stop the process
of Europeanization.
The big advantage of the action plans, which were developed for other ENP countries and
potential EU candidates, is that in order to receive the award – an EU membership – the country
has to adopt the whole EU acquis and accept all the rules that the EU poses. Russia, however,
does not desire a membership in the EU (and it would be a hard thing to achieve, seeing as only a
part of Russia is situated in the European territory, and with the size of the country it would be
hard to determine whether it is Russia which joins the EU, or the other way round).  The moment
terminology switches from “accession” to “association”, the value of a reward decreases
significantly, and if the EU is not able to find equally appealing motivation, chances of
conditionality policy to work are not too high. In the case of Russia, the EU did manage to find
some very appealing rewards – a possibility to be a part of Europe, without actually be politically
bound to its institutions. It can be done with a Free Trade Agreement (which is a reward for
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fulfilling obligations in the Economy sphere), a visa-free travel (which is a reward for
obligations within the area of Freedom, Security and Justice) and education exchanges (mainly,
joining Bologna process and adjusting Russian educational system to that of the EU). The
problem with these rewards is that, however appealing they are, they are not the rewards for
adopting the whole acquis of conditions. Four common spaces agreement is essentially four
different documents, and even within common space only the economic one has the ultimate
reward for implementing all of the conditions. Russia can choose to adopt standards in
education, and receive the reward for it. In the meantime, however, demands in other areas
would remain unfulfilled, as the EU does not provide enough motivation for these areas.
Therefore the EU is unable to propose a reward for Russia that would be as appealing and
desired as the membership to the potential EU candidates.
Veto players in Russia also play a big role. There is an opinion that even if it was possible
for Russia to join the EU, or that if, for example, visa-free travel was extremely desired by
Russia, it still would not fulfill all its commitments simply because that would mean the elites
would lose power and money. Even in the simplest things, like encryption standards: Russian
Federal Security Service wants to be able to track and interfere in people’s private
correspondence because of security or political reasons, and if the EU standards are to be
implemented, they would lose some of their power in hand. It is no secret that Russia has one of
the most corrupt systems in the world, but for government to start actively fighting it would
mean fighting against themselves, as business and the state are tightly intertwined. Most of
Vladimir Putin’s friends are now millionaires and can be seen in the list of the wealthiest people
in the world according to the Forbes magazine. The majority of businessmen who receive the
most of state’s contracts are affiliated with Vladimir Putin in one way or another.14
If Russia was to adopt the EU acquis as the other countries did, then it would have to
improve the situation with human rights, respect the freedom of speech and hold crystal clear
elections.  But that would mean the end to the authoritarian regime, and the ultimate loss of
power of the elites, therefore conducting all of the changes that the EU wanted Russia to carry
out is impossible. Belarus had essentially the same problem, and the regime of Lukashenko was
strong enough to resist all the Europeanization efforts, because it would mean the end to the rule
of the current president. Besides the promise of the EU membership was too distant to be even
considered seriously.
However, Russia does comply with some parts of the agreements. Why does it happen?
Ultimately, Russia does have a desire to be closer to Europe. In fact, the former president of
14 Noviy Region (2012) “Forbes sostavil reiting korolej goszakaza: v liderah okazalis druzia Putina”
http://www.nr2.ru/finance/375673.html
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Russia Dmitry Medvedev on several occasions stated that Russia is a part of Europe and has
European values.15 But being an authoritarian regime, it could only endorse changes that do not
have a political context. For example, having a Free Trade agreement would be very profitable
for Russia, and economic changes for the most part do not require political reforms (except for
the part where economical corruption is intertwined with political), therefore Russia was willing
to accept conditions (and the Common Economic space is the only one which even has the word
“condition” in the preamble).
If the goal is desirable for Russia, and it does not require political changes, Russia is all in
favor of conditionality. In fact, Russia starts insisting on a strong conditional language – like in
the situation with a visa-free agreement. By the end of 2011 the EU and Russia agreed on
following steps which would lead to the official start of negotiations on a visa-free travel
agreement. The main argument between two sides was that Russia wanted to make these steps as
technical as possible, and wanted to include the close that upon fulfilling its obligations the
agreement would be operational immediately. The EU however wanted to have a place for
maneuvering, stating that fulfilling technical obligations would not automatically mean the
abolition of visas.16  The reason for that disagreement is that Russia does not want Europe to
have this loophole, because upon fulfilling technical conditions the EU might start demanding
some political changes, which would place Russia in a difficult position. They would already put
so much effort in visa abolition process, but political reform is still not something that Russia
would be willing to carry out. Recently on the EU-Russia Summit the newly elected president
Vladimir Putin stated that the existence of visa regime between Russia and the EU is a real
obstacle in the development of their economical relationship.17 To show how important the visa
issue is to him, Putin unilaterally abolished visas for businessmen (who have a special card for
business travel) from the countries that participate in the Asia-Pasific Economic Cooperation
(APEC).18
That is why, in order to only fulfill the obligations that it wants to fulfill, Russia refuses to
accept any kind of strong conditional language in the text of treaties, preferring to agree on a
vague wording of the issues that the EU wants to include in the document. It gives the EU the
satisfaction of having the issue raised, and at the same time does not in fact involve any actual
15 Expert (2012) “Rossiya – eto chast Evropy. Medvedev: Rossiya primet uchastie v programmah finansovoj
podderzhki stran ES” http://expert.ru/2011/11/3/rossiya---eto-chast-evropyi/
16 The Moscow Times (2010) “Visa-Free Travel to Europe in the Cards for Russians”
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/vedomosti/article/visa-free-travel-to-europe-in-the-cards-for-
russians/405840.html
17 RIA Novosti (2012, June 4) Putin: vizy tormozjat sotridnichestvo v ekonomike
(http://www.ria.ru/politics/20120604/664749970.html)
18 Rosbalt (2012, June 7) Putin otmenil vizy dlja inostrantzev – uchastnikov foruma ATES
(http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2012/06/07/989871.html)
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obligations that Russia will be forced to fulfill. The EU is willing to take this kind of agreement
in hopes that even the weak wording could be helpful in the future negotiations on the sensitive
issues.
Why is the EU not able to make Russia to comply with the conditions? Mainly, because the
Member States do not seem to be able to come to an agreement about the common strategy
towards Russia and it influences all other aspects of bilateral relationship. The lack of internal
agreement makes conditional threats and promises less credible, because it is almost impossible
to predict what decision the EU will make under different circumstances. Good relationship with
several EU member states could help Russia to negotiate a visa-free travel agreement, as well as
a Free Trade agreement without fulfilling all of the obligations. The lack of consensus on how
strong the language and the attitude towards Russia should be prevents the EU to take a more
stable and coherent stance on the bilateral issues.
Because the EU is unable to act as one, it is also unable to exercise all the advantages that it
has over Russia. However, it remains doubtful that the policy of conditionality would actually
work even if the EU had one opinion on the relationship with Russia. Russia is not a typical
country that would accept any kind of conditions from the EU, because 1) it does not need the
EU that urgently and 2) the EU also needs Russia. Russia has a booming economy, which is
based on the natural resources, and is not in an urgent need of financial support from the EU. It
does want to be closer to Europe, and, for example, the free trade with the EU would be very
beneficial. For the EU, such thing would be beneficial too, therefore (as a predominantly
economical union) it is less inclined to be very strict in its approach. And since the EU is heavily
dependant on Russia’s natural resources, it would be extra cautious in order not to upset their
suppliers.
If the EU were to connect, for example, all of the benefits to the implementation of the
whole set of conditions, Russia would be even less likely to cooperate: the time of achieving the
reward would increase significantly, and some of the conditions that Russia deems unacceptable
(like human rights cooperation, where Russia refuses almost all of the EU initiatives on a regular
basis) would prevent Russia from even starting to work on the reforms.
Therefore in the current circumstances it seems that the EU conditionality was doomed
from the start. However, if the EU still believes the need to influence Russia’s behavior, it might
be interesting to explore the possibility of following the logic of the social learning and lesson
drawing model. Currently the dissatisfaction with the regime of Vladimir Putin is growing. Mass
demonstrations in the winter 2011-2012 were held by the young, educated people from big cities,
discontented by the fact that democratic values that Russia supposedly supports were
undermined during Parliamentary and Presidential elections. A lot of these people were born
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already after the downfall of the USSR, had the ability to travel outside Russia and enjoy
educational exchanges and then compare the standards of living in the EU with that of their own
country. If anyone is able to transform Russia, it is the young generation, who will come to rule
the country in 10-20 years. That is why the policy of the EU in the field of research and
education right now is more than effective: by creating a common research area with Russia, the
EU not only gains from the potential ideas that Russian students and researchers bring to them,
but that also creates a cluster of well-educated people who potentially in the future can influence
the policy of Russian Federation and bring it to adopt the EU rules as well.
If the EU is unable to develop a common stricter approach, it should abandon the idea of
Europeanization through conditionality altogether. It has been a common opinion upon the
scholars that studied the policy of conditionality towards Russian Federation. The EU holds onto
that policy because it is unable to produce any other approach that would satisfy its need to
promote integration and be the ultimate normative producer (i.e. establishing the norms in the
society). However, with Russia it simply does not work – Russia tries to create its own norms,
and does not want to integrate that much, and the EU is too dependant on Russian natural
resources to be able to concentrate on the common strategy. If that is the case, the most logical
way around this problem would be diminishing the policy despite its appeal to the EU. That, of
course, does not mean that the technical requirements should be abandoned. Until Russia is
nominally ready for the free trade (implement all the necessary standards, etc.) or visa-free travel
(issuing biometric passports and strengthening border control), these agreements should not be
concluded. But after technical requirements are fulfilled, the EU should consider opening its
borders to Russia without precondition of, for example, improving human rights situation. The
officials of Russia do not have any troubles of getting visas to Europe, so they would not be
motivated to fulfill this requirement. However, if more and more Russians would be able to
travel to Europe and see the life there, it is possible that they would be able to make their
government to change the policy eventually.
Therefore I find the “soft power” approach to be more effective when dealing with Russia.
This country historically has been very determined in avoiding any kind of invasion from abroad,
and the mentality of superpower sometimes prevents it from accepting conditional agreements. If
the EU has the goal of “Europeanizing” Russia, it has to use a more subtle approach (which has
already been a case when the EU wisely decided not to insist on naming the Four Common
Spaces a part of the ENP). It might not be as quick in producing results as conditionality in the
relationship with some other potential candidate states, but it has a better chance of being
successful in this particular situation.
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